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This paper uses the recently collected Living Standard Measurement Study–Integrated Surveys on
Agriculture Initiative data sets from five countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to provide a comprehensive
overview of factor market participation by agrarian households and to formally test for failures in rural
markets. Under complete and competitive markets, households can solve their consumption and produc-
tion problems separately, so that household factor endowments do not predict input demand. This paper
implements a simple, theoretically grounded test of this separation hypothesis, which can be interpreted
as a reduced form test of market failure. In all five study countries, the analysis finds strong evidence of
factor market failure. Moreover, those failures appear general and structural, not specific to subpopula-
tions defined by gender, geography, human capital, or land quality. However, we show that rural markets
are not generally missing in an absolute sense, suggesting that market existence is less of a problem than
market function.
 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.1. Introduction
In the structural adjustment era of the 1980–90s, widespread
belief in the efficiency of markets underpinned a broad transition
away from government management and toward market liberal-
ization in much of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In the ensuing decade
and a half, as it has become clear that liberalization per se was not
sufficient to raise growth rates and rapidly reduce poverty
throughout the region, attention has returned to market failures.
Among the markets most widely believed to be failing or incom-
plete are the agricultural factor markets of SSA. And indeed, there
are good reasons to suspect that rural markets are not functioning
well in this region, as agricultural productivity and rates of modern
input use lag far behind the rest of the world (World Bank, 2008).
With the aim of stimulating productivity growth and reducing pov-
erty, substantial resources are committed each year to programs
aimed at improving the function of agricultural input and output
markets in African economies.
To make appropriate policy choices in an atmosphere of poten-
tially dysfunctional or imperfect markets it is important to distin-
guish between three cases. The first is a situation in which a
market is truly missing, in the sense that exchange is legally pro-
hibited, rendered infeasible by some non-market force, or impossi-ble to undertake without the creation of a new regulatory or
market-making institution. The second is a case in which a market
is in operation but failing in the sense that exchange takes place at
non-competitive prices, i.e., prices that do not equate marginal
benefit and marginal cost. And the third situation is one in which
a market is present and functioning at competitive prices, but wel-
fare outcomes for some households are so low that the develop-
ment community uses the mantle of ‘‘market failure” to motivate
interventions aimed at improving wellbeing.
To illustrate, consider the following situation for a generic agri-
cultural input. Suppose that the market for the input is hampered
by high transaction costs, weak enforcement of contracts, and sig-
nificant output risk – features common to rural economies in SSA.
These forces could induce market failure by causing mismatches in
supply and demand or underpinning the formation of oligopolies
by a small number of active suppliers. But these features also
increase suppliers’ costs, which shifts supply curves inward, raises
equilibrium prices, and reduces trading volumes. If it is the latter
case that pertains in a particular market, then low input use is
the equilibrium outcome of competitive markets, even though it
may be sub-optimal from a social perspective.
This distinction is essential to policy design, because the instru-
ments to fix missing markets are not the same as those to intro-
duce competition to non-competitive markets or to increase the
welfare of certain agents in a well-functioning market. If evidence
suggests that factor markets are missing in their entirety, themarket
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rights, removing restrictions on certain forms of exchange, or pro-
viding public goods that make exchange feasible (e.g., information,
roads, agricultural research stations). If, by contrast, there is robust
evidence of market exchange but evidence indicates that agricul-
tural factor markets are not competitive, then there is a case for
interventions directly targeted at the sources of market failure.
These might take the form of policies to improve contract enforce-
ment, to end collusion, or to lower costs of production through
investment in public goods and services such as physical (e.g.,
power, roads, telecommunications, water) and institutional (e.g.,
grades and standards) infrastructure. Finally, if a market exists
and operates at market-clearing prices, but outcomes are consid-
ered sub-optimal from a social perspective, then greater attention
should be paid to increasing the value above current market prices
of the land and labor that constitute the primary endowments of
the poorest households. Policies in this domain may include train-
ing and education, subsidies, taxes and transfer to mitigate endow-
ment inequalities, or temporary assistance to stimulate learning-
by-doing or take advantage of agglomeration externalities.
The aim of this paper is to provide an over-arching, updated
view of agricultural land and labor markets in sub-Saharan Africa,
in light of the above categorization. The analysis is in two parts.
First, we document the patterns of market participation by agricul-
tural households using recently collected, nationally representa-
tive data from five countries: Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, Tanzania,
and Uganda. We show with descriptive evidence that, in fact, a
large share of farmers transact in agricultural labor and/or land
markets, as well as in the market for other, related goods.1 These
markets plainly exist and are used extensively. While transaction
costs may prohibit market participation by some households in
some markets (de Janvry et al., 1991), it would clearly be incorrect
to characterize the land and labor markets of SSA as missing in a
broad sense.
Second, we use a well-established, reduced form approach to
test for market failures (Benjamin, 1992; Udry, 1999). The test is
grounded in the standard model of the agricultural household
(Singh et al., 1986), which makes explicit the prediction that under
complete and competitive markets households can make decisions
about production and consumption separately. This is widely
known as the separation hypothesis. If the separation hypothesis
holds, households behave as if they allocate resources to maximize
farm profits first, and then make consumption choices conditional
on the budget set that results from farm profit maximization.
Endowments and preferences affect consumption, but not first-
stage production choices. This generates the testable prediction
that the household’s labor endowment is not predictive of labor
demand on the family farm when markets are functioning well.2
We test this prediction for the five study countries. Our findings
strongly reject the null hypothesis of complete and competitive
markets. Although there is some between-country variation in
the elasticity of farm labor demand with respect to the number
of working age household members, our main estimates lie in
the range 0.32–0.53 for all countries. We further show that the pat-
tern of market failures is general and structural, related neither to
the gender or education of the household head nor to geographic
characteristics such as the distance to roads or large population
centers. We do find that in a few cases the degree of market failure1 See Sheahan and Barrett (2014), Palacios-Lopez et al. (2015), and Deininger et al.
(2015) for detailed analyses of these related markets using data from the same survey
project that we use.
2 There is also a structural approach to the study of the separable household model,
involving estimation of production functions and comparison of the marginal product
of inputs to their market prices (Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994; Barrett et al., 2008; Le,
2010). We focus on the reduced form approach because it lends itself more readily to
interpretation as a specific test of market failures.
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formance across the region is related at least in part to agro-
climatic factors outside households’ control (Binswanger-Mkhize
and Savastano, 2014).
Although we implement the above test using the labor demand
equations of household farms, the results of these tests do not
reveal whether the underlying market frictions are in the market
for labor or for some other good. Rejection of the separation
hypothesis is evidence that at least two factor or output markets
fail to clear at competitive prices (it is well known that resource
flows and relative prices can adjust to accommodate one
quasi-fixed or non-tradable factor of production – see Feder,
1985). However, if there are failures in at least two markets, then
the separation hypothesis will generally be rejected even if the
market in which the test is implemented is capable of functioning
well (in the sense that prices and quantities can adjust to equate
marginal benefit and marginal cost).3
Overall our findings suggest that while factor markets are not
missing, even 15–20 years after structural adjustment there is rea-
son to believe that widespread market failures in rural SSA lead to
sub-optimal resource allocation. This impedes productivity growth
and poverty reduction. Of course, not every market failure is suffi-
cient to merit intervention, and determining which market imper-
fections should be targeted by governments and donors requires
case-by-case analysis of the related costs and benefits (Holden
and Binswanger, 1998). The contribution here is to use recent,
nationally representative data and theoretically grounded tests to
show that in recent years market existence is less of a problem than
market function, and to characterize the extent of the latter at the
national scale.
The work here contributes to two primary strands of literature.
The first is the voluminous body of work on agricultural input mar-
kets in sub-Saharan Africa, to which we cannot do justice with a
review. It does bear mentioning that our findings align with one
of the central themes in Fafchamps (2004), which documents the
widespread existence, richness, and adaptability of rural markets
in SSA.
This paper also contributes to the recent body of work evalu-
ating market function or testing the necessary conditions consis-
tent with market failure in a variety of settings in sub-Saharan
Africa. Not surprisingly, the findings in this literature are mixed.
Berg (2013) uses anticipated changes in household income in
South Africa to test for the presence of credit constraints. While
he cannot reject that the observed patterns are due to precaution-
ary savings, he does find strong indicative evidence of credit mar-
ket failures. In the context of a multi-factorial randomized
controlled trial, Karlan et al. (2014) find strong evidence for
incomplete insurance markets among farmers in Ghana. Barrett
et al. (2008) show with data from Côte d’Ivoire that significant
differences exist between shadow wages derived from estimated
production functions and local market wages paid the same
workers, which can be interpreted as evidence of failure in mul-
tiple agricultural input markets. On the other hand, separate stud-
ies from Kenya and Malawi suggest that given the relative prices
of outputs and fertilizer, subsidies may induce most farmers to
apply fertilizer at levels well beyond that which is profitable, call-
ing into question the degree to which input market failures are a
binding constraint on productivity (Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2009;
Sheahan, 2011). This paper augments these country-specific stud-
ies by applying a standardized, general test to recent, high quality
data from five different countries.3 The natural next step is to ask whether we can use additional tests to determine
which markets are the source of the underlying failure. That is the subject of ongoing
work.
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section we briefly review the core theoretical model, the optimal
conditional factor demand functions derived from that model that
underpin the separation hypothesis, and the empirical specifica-
tion of the reduced form test of that hypothesis. Data and descrip-
tive statistics are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents results,
and Section 5 concludes.
2. Theory and empirical framework
In this section we outline a basic model of the agricultural
household and emphasize the role played by the separation
hypothesis. Our goal is only to describe the basic empirical frame-
work, so we leave aside complicating factors that can be readily
incorporated but that do not change the central implications of
the model. The exposition in this section most directly follows
Udry (1999) and Barrett et al. (2008), and is effectively a single per-
iod version of the model in LaFave and Thomas (2014).4
In a particular cropping year a household has a total labor
endowment of L, which it divides between leisure Ll, work on the
household farm L f , and supply of labor to the market, Lm. The
household has preferences over consumption of goods, C, and lei-
sure, Ll, represented by the strictly increasing, concave utility func-
tion UðC; LljZÞ. The utility function is conditional on household
characteristics Z, which includes endowments not explicitly
denoted elsewhere. The household produces a single food com-
modity, y, for sale or consumption using a strictly increasing, con-
cave production technology y ¼ FðL;X;AÞe, where L represents total
labor application, X is a vector of non-labor inputs, A represents
land inputs, and the stochastic variable e, which follows known
distribution gðeÞ, represents exogenous agro-climatic factors such
as pests and weather conditions. The household owns land A and
rents in (net) land area Ar , the sum of which is total land in culti-
vation, A. The household can hire labor on the market, represented
by Ld. Let px be the vector of non-labor input prices, w be the mar-
ket wage rate, pA be the price of land, and p be the price of the out-
put, all of which are known to the household. Under these
conditions the household’s expected utility maximization problem
is:
MaxC;Ll ;Lh ;Ld ;Lm ;Ar ;XEe½UðC; LljZÞ ð1Þ
subject to:
pC wLm 6 pFðL;X;AÞewLd  pxX  pAAr ð2Þ
L  L f þ Ld ð3Þ
A  Aþ Ar ð4Þ
LP L f þ Lm þ Ll ð5Þ
Ll; L f ; Ld; Lm;X;A;C P 0 ð6Þ
where the expectation is taken over gðeÞ.
Under standard assumptions about the utility function, weak
inequalities (2) and (5) bind at the solution. The problem can be
solved by first choosing total agricultural labor demand L, non-
labor inputs X, and land inputs A to maximize expected farm profit.
This is represented by the right-hand side of the inequality in (2).
The household then solves its expected utility maximization prob-
lem conditional on optimal profits. This is the essence of the sepa-4 The canonical reference is Singh et al. (1986). Lau et al. (1978) and Benjamin
(1992) were also helpful in developing the model outlined here.
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household can buy and sell labor, land and other inputs at exoge-
nous, market-clearing prices, so that its production and consump-
tion decisions can be examined as if they were distinct problems.
If the separation hypothesis holds, the solution to the house-
hold’s problem implies the following:
Pðp;px;pA;wÞ ¼ maxA;X;LEe½pFðL;X;AjWÞewLd  pxX  pAA
ð7Þ
L ¼ Lðp;px;pA;wjeÞ ð8Þ
A ¼ Aðp;px;pA;wjeÞ ð9Þ
X ¼ Xðp;px;pA;wjeÞ ð10Þ
C ¼ Cðp;px;pA;w; L;AojZ; eÞ ð11Þ
where Eq. (7) is the profit function, Eqs. (8)–(10) are the input
demand functions, and Eq. (11) is the consumption function.
Various tests based on Eqs. (7)–(10) can be interpreted as tests
of the underlying assumption of complete and competitive factor
markets. As is clear in these equations, inputs depend only on
exogenous factors if the separation hypothesis holds. This suggests
a reduced form strategy for testing the separation hypothesis:
include in the estimation of an input demand function any other
variable that does not appear in Eqs. (7)–(10) but that does appear
in Eq. (11), i.e., any variable that affects consumption behavior but
not production choices when markets are complete. Natural
options are the household labor endowment or other household
characteristics that should influence consumption patterns with-
out impacting the household’s full income. A test of complete
and competitive markets can be implemented as a test of the
exclusionary restriction implied by the theory, that production
input demands are invariant to household characteristics. In par-
ticular, labor demand on the farm should be invariant to household
labor endowments, L, measured as the number of working age
adults. This is the intuition underlying most of the tests in
Benjamin (1992). Following this approach, we focus on the restric-
tion implied by Eq. (8), the conditional labor demand function of
the household under the null hypothesis of complete and compet-
itive markets.
To test the restriction implied by the separation hypotheses, we
estimate regressions of total farm labor demand on prices, land and
labor endowments, and household characteristics Zh, using the fol-
lowing general specification:
log Lh ¼ aþ b log Lh þ d logAh þ cZh þ /Pricesþ lh ð12Þ
where ða;b; d; c;/Þ represent coefficients, the subscript h indicates
households, and l is a mean zero, i.i.d., normally distributed error
term. In this case the separation hypothesis is represented by the
null hypothesis, H0 : b ¼ 0. Rejection of that null in favor of the
alternate hypothesis, HA : b–0, implies rejection of the exclusion
restriction that follows directly from the presence of complete
and competitive markets.
We report OLS estimates of Eq. (12), separately for each of the
five study countries. In focusing on this baseline specification we
make a number of simplifying assumptions. In particular, we treat
the endowments of land and household size as exogenous. House-
hold size in our empirical tests is defined as the number of adults
aged 15+. We do not further disaggregate household size by demo-
graphic characteristics of household members, opting instead to
include demographic controls in Zh. We ignore the role of supervi-
sory household labor as a complement to hired labor. To adjust for
possible productivity differences between children and adults, we
scale the contribution of child workers on farm by 0.5. Finally, werkets in Sub-Saharan Africa: An updated view with formal tests for market
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plot, ignoring inter-cropping. However, the Uganda survey provides data on the
4 B. Dillon, C.B. Barrett / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxignore harvest period labor because it is generally interpreted as
proportional to output, rather than an input to production.5
The test of the separation hypothesis implicit in Eq. (12) cannot
be interpreted as a test of labor market failure specifically. It is well
understood that multiple market failures are required to generate
distortions in factor or output markets because relative prices – not
absolute prices – are what matters in determining the efficient
allocation of resources (Feder, 1985). For example, in this context
the fact that production is risky and crop insurance is unavailable
is not sufficient on its own to generate a rejection of the separation
hypothesis. If, however, we reject the null hypothesis that the coef-
ficient on household size is statistically indistinguishable from
zero, we can conclude that some markets (potentially including
markets for credit, insurance, or land) are failing. A detailed explo-
ration of precisely which markets are failing is left to future
analysis.
3. Data
The data for this paper are from the Living Standards Measure-
ment Study and Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) pro-
ject, sponsored by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and
implemented by the national statistics offices of participating
countries with technical expertise and oversight provided by the
Development Research Group of the World Bank.6 These nationally
representative data sets cover a comprehensive set of demographic,
health, economic and agricultural topics. Although there is variation
in survey content between countries, efforts were made to ensure as
much cross-national comparability as possible in questionnaire
design and coverage. Panel data are available for some countries
and will be available for all study countries in the coming years,
though in this paper we make use of only a single cross section for
each country. For each country we restrict the sample to households
that report cultivation of a positive amount of land during the season
under study.
We use data from the five LSMS-ISA countries with sufficient
information on agricultural labor demand: Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger,
Tanzania, and Uganda. Because the hypotheses of interest to this
paper relate to market function within a cultivation period, we
have not combined data across multiple cropping seasons. Instead,
we use data relevant for the major cropping season in a single,
nearly contemporaneous wave of each of the data sets. These are
the 2011 cropping season in Ethiopia; the 2008/2009 rainy season
in Malawi; the 2010 rainy season in Niger; the 2010 long rainy sea-
son in Tanzania; and the first cropping season of 2010 in Uganda.
3.1. Household-level summary statistics
Table 1 shows summary statistics at the household level for all
five study countries. In Ethiopia, the average household has 5.24
members of all ages, with slightly more males than females. Just
over 80% of households are male-headed. Education levels among
household heads are the second lowest of the study countries, at
1.61 years of education on average. Of the 2.81 acres owned by
the average household, 76% is cultivated, 3% is left fallow, and
22% is used for all other purposes, including pastures, forest land,
and renting out. The average household cultivates more than 11
plots, with each crop stand on a single parcel listed as a separate
plot. Eighteen percent of cultivated acreage is described as rented
or borrowed. Household allocate a majority of cultivated land to
the production of staple grains – maize, sorghum, and teff – with5 Harvest labor is included in total labor demand for households in Uganda,
because hired labor in the Uganda data is not disaggregated by activity.
6 See the project website for additional details: http://go.worldbank.org/
OQQUQY3P70.
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The next set of columns show similar statistics from the 2010–
2011 Malawi survey. The Malawi survey includes over 10,000
households, only a quarter of which are designated as panel survey
households. We restrict our analysis to the panel households
because the labor demand modules given to cross-sectional and
panel households are slightly different, and labor demand issues
are central to the questions in this paper.
In Table 1 we see that households in Malawi are slightly (but
not statistically significantly) smaller than those in Ethiopia, with
4.96 members on average. Household heads are far more educated
on average (4.98 years of education) than in Ethiopia, and almost a
quarter of households are female-headed. The average household
owns 1.58 acres and owns or cultivates 2 separate plots.8 Of the
acreage owned by households, only a very small fraction is listed
as ‘‘rented out”. Finally, crop distributions in Malawi are heavily
dominated by maize production, which accounts for 1.45 acres of
cultivated land on average. Farmers primarily use the remaining
land to cultivate pulses, nuts, and cash crops.9
In the middle of Table 1 we show summary statistics for the
Niger sample. Niger is the poorest country in the study. House-
holds are especially large, encompassing almost seven people, on
average. Only 8% of household heads are female. Educational
attainment by household heads is the lowest among study coun-
tries, averaging less than one year completed. Households report
significantly greater land ownership than in the other study coun-
tries, with average holdings of almost 12 acres. Although this
statistic is driven in part by a small number of large landowners,
the median household owns 7.4 acres, which is still larger than
the average acres owned in any other study country. Farming
households in Niger cultivate almost all of the land that they
own, and rent an average of 1.6 acres of additional land for cultiva-
tion. Cultivation is concentrated heavily in sorghum, millet, and
beans, with relatively small amounts of land allocated to other
crops.
The next set of columns in Table 1 provides summary statistics
for the 2010–2011 data from Tanzania. As mentioned above, agri-
cultural variables for Tanzania refer only to the long rainy season.
Not surprisingly, the demographic characteristics of households in
Tanzania are more similar to those for Malawi than Ethiopia or
Niger. The average sample household from Tanzania has 5.55
members, with slightly more females than males. Household heads
are 25% female, and have 4.58 years of education on average.
Households in Tanzania report owning less land than those in
Niger, but much more land than those in smaller Malawi or more
populous Ethiopia: 5.31 acres on average, 81% of which is culti-
vated and 15% of which is fallow. Only 2% of owned land is
described as ‘‘rented out”, while 14% of cultivated land is listed
as rented in or borrowed. Maize is the primary crop in Tanzania,
with 2.2 acres of maize grown by the average household. Land allo-
cation to the other crop categories – other grains, rice, tubers
(including cassava), pulses and nuts, cash crops, and other crops
(including banana) – ranges from 0.31 to 0.57 acres on average.
Finally, in the rightmost columns of Table 1 we provide a similar
set of summary statistics for Uganda. Households in Uganda have
6.64 members on average, again with slightly more females than
males. Only 71% of households in Uganda are male-headed.percentage of land allocated to each crop at the plot level, and we use this information
to distribute plot-level acreage to every crop listed on each plot.
8 The definition of a ‘‘plot” varies between surveys, so that this statistic is not
directly comparable across countries.
9 For the summary statistics we define as cash crops all non-food crops, including
tobacco, cotton, and sisal, as well as coffee and tea.
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Household-level summary statistics for all study countries.
Ethiopia Malawi Niger Tanzania Uganda
Mean s.d. N Mean s.d. N Mean s.d. N Mean s.d. N Mean s.d. N
Household size 5.24 2.2 3094 4.96 2.29 2666 6.78 3.53 2339 5.55 2.95 2630 6.64 3.46 2135
Male head = 1 0.81 3094 0.77 2666 0.92 2339 0.75 2630 0.71 2135
Education of head (yrs) 1.61 2.72 3039 5.22 4.18 2646 0.87 2.35 2339 4.58 3.37 2582 4.69 3.34 1813
Number of males 2.66 1.52 3094 2.4 1.53 2666 3.37 2.09 2339 2.7 1.8 2630 3.22 2.09 2135
Number of females 2.56 1.38 3094 2.56 1.44 2666 3.41 2.11 2339 2.85 1.78 2630 3.43 2.11 2135
No. plots own/cultivate 11.69 7.33 3094 2.05 1.13 2666 3.04 1.96 2339 2.3 1.32 2630 5.65 2.69 2135
Acres owned 2.81 5.25 3094 1.58 1.73 2666 11.98 19.65 2339 5.31 10.51 2630 3.29 10.27 2135
Share cultivate 0.76 0.26 2790 0.99 0.1 2043 0.98 0.12 1969 0.81 0.34 2341 0.9 0.24 1952
Share rent out 0.01 0.07 2043 0.01 0.08 1969 0.02 0.12 2341 0 0.05 1952
Share fallow 0.03 0.11 2790 0.01 0.06 2043 0.01 0.07 1969 0.15 0.31 2341 0.07 0.2 1952
Share other 0.22 0.24 2790 0 0.01 2043 0.01 0.07 1969 0.03 0.14 2341 0.02 0.14 1952
Acres cultivated 2.7 4.23 3094 1.92 1.73 2666 13.62 19.05 2339 4.31 7.93 2630 2.98 7.41 2135
Share own 0.82 0.32 2810 0.79 0.39 2588 0.81 0.35 2202 0.86 0.32 2409 0.79 0.34 2073
Share rent/borrow 0.18 0.32 2810 0.21 0.39 2588 0.19 0.35 2202 0.14 0.32 2409 0.21 0.34 2073
Maize: acreage 0.49 1.83 2826 1.45 1.27 2567 2.2 4.13 2402 0.41 2.21 2075
Sorghum: acreage 0.37 1.12 2826 2.42 4.49 2127
Rice: acreage 0.03 0.23 2567 0.44 2.13 2402 0.03 0.21 2075
Millet: acreage 6.14 8.25 2127
Other grains: acreage 1.01 1.54 2826 0.03 0.24 2567 0.13 0.74 2127 0.39 2.45 2402 0.21 0.88 2075
Tubers: acreage 0.02 0.09 2826 0.04 0.31 2567 0.05 0.41 2127 0.57 2.11 2402 0.94 5.14 2075
Pulses/nuts: acreage 0.32 0.88 2826 0.22 0.51 2567 4.56 6.44 2127 0.49 5.18 2402 0.62 2.47 2075
Cash crops: acreage 0.24 0.79 2826 0.18 0.57 2567 0 0.06 2127 0.34 2.25 2402 0.23 1.47 2075
Other crops: acreage 0.23 0.55 2826 0.01 0.1 2567 0.37 1.85 2127 0.31 1.83 2402 0.61 3.29 2075
B. Dillon, C.B. Barrett / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 5Households own 3.29 acres on average, and own or cultivate 5.65
plots. Ninety percent of owned land is cultivated, 7% is fallow,
and essentially none is described as ‘‘rented out”. Households
report cultivating just under 3 acres on average, 79% of which is
owned and 21% of which is described as rented in or borrowed.
Tubers, including cassava, account for the largest proportion of cul-
tivated acreage, followed by pulses/nuts and ‘‘other crops” (which
includes all bananas). Only 0.41 acres of maize are cultivated on
average.
3.2. Market participation: Summary statistics
In Table 2 we present sample statistics for participation in land
markets by sample households. Across study countries there is sur-
prising consistency in the pattern of renting or borrowing land for
cultivation, with percentages ranging from 19.6% in Tanzania to
38.7% in Uganda. The percentage of sample households renting
land in is much larger than that renting land out. There is likewise
general consistency in the average amount of land rented or bor-
rowed in, with estimates in all countries but Niger lying between
0.38 and 0.62 acres. In Niger the average household cultivated over
two acres of rented or borrowed land. Average acres rented out is
less than average acres rented in for all study countries, as one
would expect in a sample restricted to households that cultivate,
as the subsample of cultivators necessarily omits households that
own but do not cultivate land, who are by definition net suppliers
of rented land.
Turning to the market for agricultural laborers, Table 3 shows
the percentage of households that report hiring workers for various
non-harvest activities during the studied cultivation period. This is
one area where there is substantial heterogeneity in the level of
detail covered in the LSMS-ISA surveys, therefore cross-country
comparisons should be made cautiously. The overall pattern of
labor hiring is consistent across study countries, with approxi-
mately 30–50% of households hiring workers at some point during
the cultivation season, not including the harvest. In Ethiopia and
Tanzania, just under a third of households report hiring of some
laborers (30.2% and 30.1%, respectively). For these two countries
the distribution of hiring is generally consistent across activities,
with the exception of very limited hiring for fertilizer applicationPlease cite this article in press as: Dillon, B., Barrett, C.B. Agricultural factor ma
failure. Food Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.015in Tanzania. In Malawi, Niger, and Uganda, over 40% of households
hire workers. In Malawi and Niger the rate of hiring for non-
harvest activities is almost twice that for the harvest. This is con-
sistent with the perception that if labor constraints bind because
of seasonality in demand, they are most likely to do so in the har-
vest period (Benjamin, 1992). The labor module in Uganda does not
disaggregate activities by type. Finally, in the rightmost column of
Table 3 we report the share of total person-days on farm worked by
hired laborers. The percentages are surprisingly consistent across
countries, with the average slightly above 10% and only Ethiopian
households demonstrating significantly greater usage of hired
workers. The rightmost column of Table 3 shows the average pay-
ment per hired work-day, by activity and country. These figures are
not exact measures of daily wages, because they are derived from
aggregate data. There are few important patterns to the payments
data, though two noteworthy points are that the average payment
in Uganda is much lower than elsewhere, and that the harvest
wage is the lowest or approximate lowest payment in three of
the other four countries.
The clear message of Tables 2 and 3 is that a large share of Afri-
can agricultural households hire in labor, land, or both, in any given
year. Even excluding harvest labor hiring and those households
that hire themselves out as agricultural workers and do not hire
others, at least a large minority of cultivating households partici-
pate in labor or land markets, or both. Clearly these markets exist
and have sufficient numbers of transactions that households gen-
erally act as price-takers. But the existence of markets with ade-
quate transactional density is merely a necessary condition for
the separation hypothesis to hold. As de Janvry et al. (1991) make
clear, markets can fail idiosyncratically for specific households for
any of a host of reasons. Furthermore, if other rural markets (out-
put, insurance, credit) are missing, this can manifest as a violation
of separation in the labor demand equations.
In Table 4 we document patterns of household participation in
markets or programs related to output, insurance, and credit. The
percentage of households that report selling output ranges from
28.3% in Niger to 62.9% in Ethiopia, though these estimates are
surely lower bounds on output market participation as they ignore
any sales from stocks that take place in the months between the
survey and the next harvest. A smaller percentage of householdsrkets in Sub-Saharan Africa: An updated view with formal tests for market
Table 2
Participation in land rental markets.
Ethiopiaa Malawi Niger Tanzania Uganda
N 3094 2666 2339 2630 2135
Household rents land out 7.4% 0.7% 1.2% 3.7% 0.4%
Household rents land in 22.2% 11.9% 8.5% 7.5% 20.1%
Household rents or borrows land in 32.7% 24.9% 30.9% 19.6% 38.7%
Acres rented out (mean) 0.574 0.015 0.094 0.169 0.006
Acres rented out (sd) 1.455 0.204 1.044 2.177 0.105
Acres rented in (mean) 0.605 0.381 2.156 0.404 0.615
Acres rented in (sd) 1.393 0.988 6.254 1.294 3.020
a Acres rented out is not identifiable in the ISA Ethiopia data; reported statistics are for ‘‘other” uses of land, which appears to be an upper bound on land rentals; summary
statistics based on survey weights.
Table 3
Percent of agricultural households hiring labor (weighted).
Country Activity Number of
households
Percent hiring
workers
Percent of work done
by hired labor
Average payment per day
to hired workers (USD)
Ethiopia Cultivation 3091 18.5% 16.0% 2.96
Harvest 2666 20.9% 20.1% 3.87
Overall 2666 30.2% 17.3%
Malawi Non-harvest 2605 30.7% 9.2% 4.05
Harvest 2605 16.0% 6.7% 2.70
Overall 2605 40.1% 8.6%
Niger Preparation 2339 18.2% 8.8% 4.42
Cultivation 2339 38.2% 10.5% 3.88
Harvest 2339 19.0% 8.5% 2.53
Overall 2339 48.7% 9.7%
Tanzania Planting 2630 18.1% 8.3% 3.47
Weeding 2630 19.6% 9.9% 2.34
Fertilizing 2630 2.1% 4.8% 2.76
Harvest 2630 15.8% 8.2% 2.41
Overall 2630 30.1% 8.8%
Uganda Overall 2109 45.2% 10.0% 1.35
Notes: Authors’ calculations from LSMS-ISA data; some variables collected as average hours per day, we convert to full days using conversion rate 6 h = a full work day;
average payment calculated by adding all days worked by adult men and women, plus 0.5 days per child day, and dividing by total payments to workers for the listed activity,
including in-kind payments; exchange rates to convert to USD are from July 2009 (Malawi), July 2010 (Niger, Tanzania, Uganda), July 2011 (Ethiopia).
Table 4
Rates of household participation in markets and programs.
Ethiopia Malawi Niger Tanzania Uganda
Sold any output 62.9% 39.5% 28.3% 49.2% 49.2%
Took out loan/accessed credit 27.5% 13.3% 13.3% 40.8%
Received transfer from NGO or Govt. program 13.7% 17.9% 35.6%
Received transfer from other household 16.3% 31.0% 56.4% 27.6%
At least one of the above 80.0% 68.8% 67.3% 69.0% 78.2%
Notes: Output sales include sales of tree crops but not sales from stocks that occur post-survey; credit access includes loans from SACCOs or other households, when specified;
reported averages are weighted; missing values are absent because question not included in survey.
10 The estimator for each of these figures is a local mean smoother using an
Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth chosen using the Stata default optimal rule-of-
thumb.
6 B. Dillon, C.B. Barrett / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxreport borrowing from financial institutions, SACCOs, or other
households, with rates ranging from 13.3% in Malawi and Tanzania
to 40.8% in Uganda. Between 16.3% (Ethiopia) and 56.4% (Niger) of
households report receiving a transfer from another household, a
form of social insurance that acts as a de facto form of partial crop
insurance in agricultural communities. Overall it is clear that these
markets, like those for land and labor, are in widespread operation
across the study countries. Of course, it remains highly likely that
some households are crowded out of some markets, especially
those for credit or certain transfers, because of risk-adjusted pric-
ing or rationing by local institutions with significant information
about potential participants.
Next, descriptive kernel regressions of labor hiring and labor
demand patterns give a preview of the multivariate regression
results we present in the next section, where we test thePlease cite this article in press as: Dillon, B., Barrett, C.B. Agricultural factor ma
failure. Food Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.015separation hypothesis formally. Fig. 1 shows a local polynomial
regression at the household level of the demand for non-
household hired labor (person-days) on the household land-to-
labor endowment ratio (acres owned per household member) in
Ethiopia.10 In aggregating labor across individuals, we count each
child person-day as 50% of an adult person-day. Grey shading indi-
cates the 95% confidence interval around the regression estimate.
There are two things to note in the figure. First, labor hiring is
statistically significantly increasing in the number of acres owned
per household member, as we would expect in a country with at
least some agricultural labor market activity. Second, to the extentrkets in Sub-Saharan Africa: An updated view with formal tests for market
Fig. 1. Kernel regression, non-household labor on land:labor endowment ratio,
Ethiopia.
Fig. 2. Kernel regression, total labor demand on household size, Ethiopia.
Fig. 3. Kernel regression, non-household labor on land:labor endowment ratio,
Malawi.
Fig. 4. Kernel regression, total labor demand on household size, Malawi.
B. Dillon, C.B. Barrett / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 7that any patterns are apparent in the figure, the relationship is con-
cave at higher levels of owned acreage. Or, if linear, the slope of the
regression line is clearly less than one. As the number of acres per
household member increases, hiring of outside workers does not
increase proportionally. In theory, this could be due to economies
of scale in either household labor, hired labor, or both, although the
empirical literature on smallholder agricultural production rou-
tinely supports the constant returns to scale hypothesis. However,
this pattern is also consistent with labor or credit market failures
that prevent households with greater need for outside laborers
from hiring at optimal levels.
Fig. 2 shows a kernel regression of total labor demand (family
labor plus hired labor, in adult person-days) on total household
size, again for households in Ethiopia. If labor markets were com-
plete and competitive and the separation hypothesis held, we
would expect to see no clear relationship between these two vari-
ables. Instead we see that total labor demand is increasing in the
number of household members until a household size of 7, after
which the regression line tapers off and becomes noisier. Although
this figure does not constitute a formal separation test, because the
underlying result does not condition on important covariates, it
does suggest that there exists a strong relationship between house-
hold labor endowments and the application of labor on the family
farm.
Figs. 3–10 show similar pairs of kernel regression results for
Malawi, Niger, Tanzania, and Uganda, respectively. The general
patterns in Figs. 3, 7 and 9 are consistent with that from Fig. 1
for Ethiopia: hiring of outside workers is increasing in the number
of acres per household member, but at a decreasing marginal rate.
In Fig. 5, however, we see no such pattern for households in Niger,
particularly in the region over which most of the data are concen-
trated, i.e., below eight acres per person. Instead, the number of
person-days demanded from outside workers is flat or even
slightly decreasing in the household land:labor endowment ratio.
One interpretation of this result, in combination with the observa-
tion that households in Niger rent significantly more land than
those in other study countries, is that credit-constrained house-
holds borrow against expected harvest output to rent land, but that
such loans cannot be converted into cash to hire workers.
In Figs. 4, 6, 8 and 10, the picture is clearer and absolutely con-
sistent with that of Fig. 2. Total labor demand is increasing in
household size in all study countries. This pattern anticipates the
formal hypothesis testing results presented below, that household
factor demand varies strongly with household labor endowments,Please cite this article in press as: Dillon, B., Barrett, C.B. Agricultural factor ma
failure. Food Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.015contradicting the separation hypothesis implied by the canonical
agricultural household model under the assumption of complete
and competitive factor markets.rkets in Sub-Saharan Africa: An updated view with formal tests for market
Fig. 5. Kernel regression, non-household labor on land:labor endowment ratio,
Niger.
Fig. 6. Kernel regression, total labor demand on household size, Niger.
Fig. 7. Kernel regression, non-household labor on land:labor endowment ratio,
Tanzania.
Fig. 8. Kernel regression, total labor demand on household size, Tanzania.
Fig. 9. Kernel regression, non-household labor on land:labor endowment ratio,
Uganda.
Fig. 10. Kernel regression, total labor demand on household size, Uganda.
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In Table 5 we show summary statistics for the variables used in
the country-specific regression estimates of Eq. (12). Median
wages in local currency units are based on reported wages, includ-Please cite this article in press as: Dillon, B., Barrett, C.B. Agricultural factor ma
failure. Food Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.015ing both cash and in-kind payments. These median wages are cal-
culated at the smallest level of geographical aggregation with at
least 10 observations (beginning at the zone, grappe, or TA level,
depending on the country, and moving to larger areas as needed).rkets in Sub-Saharan Africa: An updated view with formal tests for market
Table 5
Summary statistics of main variables used in regressions.
Ethiopia Malawi Niger Tanzania Uganda
Log labor demand (person-days) 4.47 3.85 4.26 4.27 4.72
1.23 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.77
Log acres owned 0.10 0.52 1.36 0.71 0.19
1.78 2.04 2.39 1.89 1.79
Log HH size 1.17 0.84 1.02 0.98 1.12
0.44 0.45 0.46 0.49 0.58
Log median wage (local currency) 2.768 5.563 6.998 7.82 8.761
1.083 0.539 0.443 0.489 0.649
Prime male share 0.33 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.37
0.20 0.23 0.18 0.24 0.23
Prime female share 0.37 0.48 0.51 0.46 0.43
0.20 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.24
Elderly female share 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.11
0.20 0.21 0.11 0.20 0.21
N 2499 2556 2183 2346 2047
Notes: Authors’ calculations from LSMS-ISA data sets; main entries are mean values, with standard deviations below; survey weights used.
B. Dillon, C.B. Barrett / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 9‘‘Prime age” is defined as ages 15–60 years, while ‘‘Elderly” indi-
cates age >60 years. The excluded demographic category is elderly
male. Note that the household size variable used here is the sum of
those two age categories; we omit children under age 15 so as to
mitigate concerns about the possible endogeneity of household
size and so as not to mix adults with young children unable or unli-
kely to work. Note that we do, however, still count child contribu-
tions to agricultural labor demand, assuming that one child work
day is equivalent to half an adult’s work day.
The results of the basic ordinary least squares (OLS) implemen-
tation of the separation hypothesis test from Eq. (12) are reported
in Table 6. All regressions are weighted by sampling probabilities,
and standard errors are clustered at the level of the zone (Ethiopia),
TA (Malawi), grappe (Niger) or district (Uganda and Tanzania). We
include location fixed effects in all models, to control for spatial
variation in prices. All of the signs of the estimated coefficients
in Table 6 are consistent with expectations, when statistically sig-
nificant. The estimated elasticity of labor demand with respect to
acres owned ranges from 0.08 in Niger to 0.19 in Ethiopia and is
statistically significant at the one percent level in all cases. The
household composition variables are for the most part not statisti-
cally significant, although when they are we see that labor demand
is increasing in the share of prime age adults and decreasing in the
share of elderly females (relative to elderly males). Finally, and
most importantly for this paper, the null hypothesis of separation
can be strongly rejected at the 1 percent level of significance in
all regressions in Table 6. The estimated elasticity of labor demand
with respect to household size (i.e., number of adults) ranges from
0.32 in Uganda to 0.75 in Niger. The magnitude of this elasticity
can be taken as a rough indicator of the depth of market failure.
In this sense the findings are similar to those from the kernel
regressions, in that demand side participation in labor markets
appears weaker in Niger than in the other study countries.
Although many households in Niger hire agricultural laborers
(Table 3), the total amount of labor applied to farms in Niger is
linked more closely to the (larger) size of Nigerien households than
it is in the other study countries. Overall, the consistent message in
Table 6 is that agricultural households in all study countries are not
served by complete and competitive markets. Market failures cre-
ate a dependency on endowments.
4.1. Are there patterns in market failures?
The preceding results describe a generalized, structural failure
of multiple factor markets in rural Africa. But are these problems
perhaps especially concentrated among identifiable subpopula-
tions? In order to explore that question we examine some of thePlease cite this article in press as: Dillon, B., Barrett, C.B. Agricultural factor ma
failure. Food Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.015household- and location-level correlates of factor market failure.
Our approach remains strictly reduced form. In order to test
whether a particular characteristic is associated with a greater or
lesser degree of market failure, we include the variable in Eq.
(12) both independently and interacted with the log of household
size variable. We are especially interested to see if these new vari-
ables diminish the magnitude or eliminate the statistical signifi-
cance of the estimated relationship between log household size
and labor demand. Such a result would suggest that factor market
failures affect primarily distinct subpopulations and are not gener-
alized within rural Africa. We consider three primary sources of
heterogeneity in access to complete markets: gender of the house-
hold head, distance from key points such as paved roads and large
population centers, and agro-ecological zone. We conclude with a
small number of additional robustness checks to control for varia-
tion in wealth, human capital, and soil quality.
Gender inequities in access to credit, inputs, labor, markets,
public services and technologies are often presumed to be wide-
spread in rural Africa. There is indeed significant prior evidence
of productivity differences by gender (Udry, 1996; Doss and
Morris, 2000). Likewise, greater distances from paved roads and
trading centers may proxy for prohibitively high transaction costs,
which prior studies have shown are correlated with agricultural
productivity (Stifel and Minten, 2008). Sub-optimal investment in
infrastructure can lead to incomplete factor markets, for example
through stock-outs of seeds and fertilizer (because of prohibitively
high transaction costs) or thin labor markets. Lastly, we consider
whether variation in agro-ecological zone, which serves as a proxy
for agricultural potential, explains variation in the degree of mar-
ket failure.
Table 7 shows the results of regressions with controls for the
gender of the household head. Perhaps surprisingly, we find little
evidence of heterogeneity in factor market performance by gender
of the head. In all study countries other than Niger, the coefficients
on both the level and interaction variables are statistically insignif-
icant and of relatively small magnitude. In Niger, the elasticity of
labor demand with respect to household size is smaller by about
half for female-headed households than for male-headed house-
holds. The differences by gender are not of inconsequential magni-
tudes. Yet, as indicated in the last row of the table, we can reject
separation for female-headed households in Niger (p-
value = 0.06). The small and statistically insignificant coefficients
on the interaction terms between log household size and female
headedness indicate that there are no meaningful differences
betweenmale- and female-headed households in Ethiopia, Malawi,
Tanzania, and Uganda. F-tests confirm that for all five countries we
can reject the null hypothesis that the effect of log household sizerkets in Sub-Saharan Africa: An updated view with formal tests for market
Table 6
Regression results from parsimonious OLS specification w/district FE.
Ethiopia Malawi Niger Tanzania Uganda
Dependent variable: Log labor demand
Log acres owned 0.186*** 0.098*** 0.083*** 0.129*** 0.141***
(0.027) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014)
Log HH size 0.616*** 0.667*** 0.747*** 0.616*** 0.315***
(0.053) (0.048) (0.076) (0.048) (0.039)
Prime male share 0.734*** 0.11 0.038 0.036 0.348**
(0.129) (0.129) (0.243) (0.147) (0.145)
Prime female share 0.095 0.251 0.263 0.204 0.331**
(0.221) (0.152) (0.243) (0.147) (0.156)
Elderly female share 0.389** 0.12 0.891*** 0.348* 0.039
(0.161) (0.197) (0.310) (0.202) (0.162)
Constant 3.397*** 3.713*** 4.450*** 4.052*** 3.186***
(0.147) (0.127) (0.273) (0.121) (0.146)
District/zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.355 0.343 0.452 0.364 0.313
N 2765 2556 2183 2364 2047
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered at the level of the zone (Ethiopia), TA (Malawi), grappe (Niger) or district (Tanzania and Uganda); fixed effects
included at those same geographical levels; sampling weights used for all regressions; dependent variable is the log of total labor demand, defined as total person-days
employed on all plots; children under age 15 are counted as 0.5 adults; harvest labor is excluded for ET, MW, NG, and TZ, but included for UG because it cannot be separately
distinguished; population shares defined with respect to adults > age 14.
*** Significant at 1%.
** Significant at 5%.
* Significant at 10%.
Table 7
OLS results with controls for gender of household head.
Ethiopia Malawi Niger Tanzania Uganda
Dependent variable: Log labor demand
Log acres owned 0.187*** 0.097*** 0.083*** 0.128*** 0.140***
(0.027) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014)
Log HH size [A] 0.579*** 0.680*** 0.816*** 0.588*** 0.331***
(0.085) (0.073) (0.074) (0.061) (0.049)
Prime male share 0.723*** 0.104 0.048 0.002 0.346**
(0.133) (0.130) (0.249) (0.153) (0.149)
Prime female share 0.2 0.202 0.461 0.079 0.326**
(0.203) (0.174) (0.282) (0.189) (0.149)
Elderly female share 0.307* 0.054 1.219*** 0.175 0.043
(0.155) (0.232) (0.323) (0.254) (0.159)
Head is female (=1) 0.138 0.018 0.450** 0.149 0.031
(0.179) (0.145) (0.199) (0.130) (0.084)
Head is female (=1)  Log HH size [B] 0.077 0.063 0.470*** 0.081 0.047
(0.155) (0.139) (0.179) (0.113) (0.061)
Constant 3.441*** 3.680*** 4.472*** 4.020*** 3.179***
(0.175) (0.136) (0.289) (0.130) (0.152)
District/zone/cluster FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.36 0.34 0.46 0.36 0.31
N 2765 2556 2183 2364 2047
F-test: [A] + [B] = 0, test statistic 19.66 41.58 3.62 56.42 32.88
F-test: [A] + [B] = 0, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered at the level of the zone (Ethiopia), TA (Malawi), grappe (Niger) or district (Tanzania and Uganda); sampling
weights used for all regressions; dependent variable is the log of total labor demand, defined as total person-days employed on all plots; children under age 15 are counted as
0.5 adults; harvest labor is excluded for ET, MW, NG, and TZ, but included for UG because it cannot be separately distinguished; population shares defined with respect to
adults > age 14; for households with zero acres owned, ‘‘Log acres owned” = ln(0.01).
*** Significant at 1%.
** Significant at 5%.
* Significant at 10%.
11 For households in Malawi the only available distance measure for markets was
distance (km) to an ADMARC center.
10 B. Dillon, C.B. Barrett / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxon log labor demand is zero for female-headed households (and
clearly the same is true for male-headed households). Overall, it
does not appear that gender of the household head helps in
explaining variation in the completeness of the markets facing
rural households.
Distance variables are similarly uninformative. For each study
country we estimated Eq. (12) including interactions and levels for
four different distance variables (separately): distance from a paved
road, distance from the closest town with 20,000+ inhabitants,Please cite this article in press as: Dillon, B., Barrett, C.B. Agricultural factor ma
failure. Food Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.015distance from a large market,11 and distance from the region or dis-
trict capital. Regression coefficients on distance variables are of neg-
ligible magnitude, and in no cases are the results of statistical and
economic significance. Additionally, inclusion of distance controls
does not have a significant effect on the coefficient estimate onrkets in Sub-Saharan Africa: An updated view with formal tests for market
B. Dillon, C.B. Barrett / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 11household size, so that the estimated violation of the separation
hypothesis is not attenuated in any of the samples. These results
are shown in Table 8. While it might be reasonable to conjecture that
rural market failures would be most acutely felt in more remote
areas, we find no evidence of such a pattern by any of several com-
mon measures of market access.
Next we examine whether the degree of market failure varies
with the agro-climate (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). For
each country we include in Eq. (12) a set of dummy variables
and interactions with log household size for the relevant agro-
ecological zones (AEZs). In each case we exclude the most common
AEZ (at the country level). Because each country has only a small
number of spatially correlated AEZs, we omit the location fixedTable 8
OLS results including interactions with distance to key points.
Ethiopia Malaw
Dependent variable: Log labor demand
Log HH size 0.592*** 0.719**
(0.099) (0.101)
Distance to large town (km) 0.001 0.007*
(0.004) (0.004)
Log HH size  Distance to town 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
Log HH size 0.610*** 0.627**
(0.091) (0.088)
Distance to market (km)a 0.003 0.006
(0.003) (0.012)
Log HH size  Distance to market 0 0.005
(0.001) (0.008)
Log HH size 0.563*** 0.661**
(0.072) (0.068)
Distance to road (km) 0.005 0.016*
(0.007) (0.009)
Log HH size  Distance to road 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.005)
Log HH size 0.685*** 0.599**
(0.085) (0.092)
Distance to capital (km) 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.004)
Log HH size  Distance to capital 0 0.001
(0.000) (0.002)
Notes: All regressions include same location fixed effects as previous tables; Standard
regressions is the log of total labor demand on farm; each row group of coefficients is f
a Malawi the ’distance to market’ variable is measured as the distance to the nearest
*** Significant at 1%.
** Significant at 5%.
* Significant at 10%.
Table 9
Log household size across agro-ecological zones.
Warm/arid Warm/semi-arid Warm/sub-humid
Ethiopia Count 34 133 101
Log HHS (mean) 1.28 1.11 1.10
Log HHS (sd) 0.41 0.48 0.48
Malawi Count 1191 789
Log HHS (mean) 0.85 0.85
Log HHS (sd) 0.45 0.46
Niger Count 416 1767
Log HHS (mean) 0.94 1.05
Log HHS (sd) 0.42 0.47
Tanzania Count 168 1355
Log HHS (mean) 0.94 1.04
Log HHS (sd) 0.47 0.50
Uganda Count 62
Log HHS (mean) 1.21
Log HHS (sd) 0.52
Please cite this article in press as: Dillon, B., Barrett, C.B. Agricultural factor ma
failure. Food Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.015effects and instead use locally estimated median wages to control
for spatial price variation.
To aid in interpretation, Table 9 shows the distribution of AEZs
across households in each country sample, as well as the mean and
standard deviation of the log HH size variable. In most of the well-
represented AEZs the mean of ‘‘Log HH size” is slightly greater than
one.
Table 10 reports the regression results. In Malawi, Niger, and
Uganda there are no significant differences between AEZs in the
way that household labor endowments relate to labor demand.
In Malawi the baseline effect for the omitted AEZ is positive and
highly significant, and the interaction terms between household
size and other AEZs are all positive and not different from zeroi Niger Tanzania Uganda
* 0.717*** 0.516*** 0.225***
(0.125) (0.067) (0.061)
0.015 0.001 0.001
(0.013) (0.002) (0.003)
0.001 0.002* 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
* 0.730*** 0.609*** 0.363***
(0.133) (0.086) (0.075)
0.008 0.003 0.008***
(0.012) (0.002) (0.003)
0 0 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
* 0.762*** 0.562*** 0.330***
(0.073) (0.062) (0.058)
0.019* 0.002 0.008
(0.012) (0.003) (0.007)
0.002 0.003* 0.003
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
* 0.606*** 0.571*** 0.296***
(0.130) (0.051) (0.053)
0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.011) (0.001) (0.002)
0.003 0.001** 0
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
errors clustered at level of FE; sample weights used; dependent variable in all
rom a separate regression.
ADMARC facility.
Warm/humid Cool/arid Cool/semi-arid Cool/sub-humid Cool/humid
7 1 868 1102 511
0.97 0.69 1.17 1.19 1.15
0.49 0.46 0.44 0.47
271 305
0.88 0.94
0.43 0.47
28 88 658 45
0.96 1.04 1.04 1.05
0.51 0.55 0.48 0.42
1064 321 567
1.25 1.22 1.20
0.57 0.55 0.59
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Table 10
OLS results allowing for heterogeneity by agro-ecological zone.
Ethiopia Malawi Niger Tanzania Uganda
Dependent variable: Log labor demand
Log acres owned 0.192*** 0.120*** 0.092*** 0.159*** 0.143***
(0.034) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Log median wage 0.029 0.143** 0.255** 0.123* 0.029
(0.065) (0.058) (0.107) (0.069) (0.047)
Log HH size 0.533*** 0.544*** 0.752*** 0.383*** 0.282***
(0.078) (0.083) (0.072) (0.073) (0.056)
AEZ T, W, A 0.333 0.390***
(0.328) (0.139)
AEZ T, W, A  Log HH size 0.474*** 0.066
(0.140) (0.106)
AEZ T, W, S-A 0.148 0.440***
(0.735) (0.166)
AEZ T, W, S-A  Log HH size 0.152 0.229
(0.540) (0.141)
AEZ T, W, H 0.901 0.925***
(0.754) (0.203)
AEZ T, W, H  Log HH size 0.036 0.533***
(0.405) (0.180)
AEZ T, W, S-H 0.135 0.185
(0.109) (0.201)
AEZ T, W, S-H  Log HH size 0.048 0.029
(0.107) (0.147)
AEZ T, C, A 0.083
(0.214)
AEZ T, C, A  Log HH size 0.135
(0.137)
AEZ T, C, S-A 0.065 0.382
(0.157) (0.272)
AEZ T, C, S-A  Log HH size 0.104 0.402**
(0.129) (0.175)
AEZ T, C, H 0.194 1.185*** 0.085
(0.217) (0.316) (0.122)
AEZ T, C, H  Log HH size 0.103 0.695*** 0.044
(0.120) (0.259) (0.091)
AEZ T, C, S-H 0.169 0.483*** 0.133
(0.151) (0.128) (0.106)
AEZ T, C, S-H  Log HH size 0.189 0.205* 0.049
(0.156) (0.110) (0.079)
R-squared 0.21 0.165 0.24 0.248 0.206
N 2499 2556 2183 2346 2047
St. errors clustered at EA level; sample weights used; for agro-ecological zones, T = ‘‘Tropics”, W = ‘‘Warm”, C = ‘‘Cool”, A = ‘‘Arid”, S-A = ‘‘Semiarid”, H = ‘‘Humid”, S-
H = ‘‘Subhumid”; most common AEZ is omitted in each regression, which is: TCS-H for Ethiopia, TWS-A for Malawi, TWS-A for Niger, TWS-H for Tanzania, TWH for Uganda; all
regressions control for share in HH population of prime age males, prime age females, and elderly females.
*** Significant at 1%.
** Significant at 5%.
* Significant at 10%.
12 B. Dillon, C.B. Barrett / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx(so the net effect in all AEZs is positive). In Niger there is a signif-
icant level difference in conditional labor demand between AEZs,
with greater demand in arid areas than semi-arid areas, but the
interaction with log of household size is again not significant. In
Uganda the estimated coefficients on interaction terms between
AEZs and household size are very small and statistically indistin-
guishable from zero. Given the nearly uniform insignificance of
the AEZ interaction terms in Table 10, it is not surprising that the
baseline ‘‘Log HH size” effects for these three countries are close
to the values reported in Table 6 for the parsimonious
specification.
For Ethiopia, the only statistically significant difference in
Table 10 (from the baseline category of cool, sub-humid tropics)
is in the warm arid areas (T, W, A), where the net effect of house-
hold size on labor demand is not statistically different from zero.12
As we see in Table 9, however, this result is based on only 34 house-12 For Ethiopia in Table 10, an F-test of the null hypothesis that the sum of the
coefficients on ‘‘Log HH size” and ‘‘AEZ T, W, A  Log HH size” is zero returns an F
value of 0.26, with a p-value of 0.61.
Please cite this article in press as: Dillon, B., Barrett, C.B. Agricultural factor ma
failure. Food Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.015holds (the areas of Ethiopia classified as warm and arid are in rela-
tively sparsely populated parts of the Afar and Somali regions).
Only in Tanzania is there any indication that the degree of rural
market failures might vary between agro-ecological zones. In col-
umn 4 of Table 10 we see that interaction terms between house-
hold size and AEZ dummy variables are statistically different
from zero, suggesting that the relationship between household size
and labor demand differs from that of the excluded AEZ (warm
sub-humid tropics). All of the interaction terms are positive, indi-
cating that in all cases, conditional labor demand increases much
more quickly with household size in the included AEZs than it does
in the warm sub-humid tropics. Differences in the elasticity of
labor demand with respect to household size range from 0.21 in
the cool sub-humid tropics to 0.70 in the cool humid tropics. This
is suggestive evidence that within Tanzania, factor market failures
are greatest in areas outside of the warm sub-humid tropics. This is
not surprising, because the warm sub-humid tropics are home to
the bulk of cultivation in Tanzania. It appears that rural market
failures are most acute where agricultural production is least
concentrated.rkets in Sub-Saharan Africa: An updated view with formal tests for market
Table 11
OLS results, key coefficients from additional robustness checks.
Ethiopia Malawi Niger Tanzania Uganda
Dependent variable: Log labor demand
Above median expenditure HHs Log HH size 0.551*** 0.665*** 0.790*** 0.518*** 0.324***
(0.079) (0.078) (0.097) (0.078) (0.048)
Below median expenditure HHs Log HH size 0.736*** 0.700*** 0.757*** 0.683*** 0.326***
(0.086) (0.073) (0.099) (0.069) (0.056)
Head education Log HH size 0.778*** 0.588*** 0.805** 0.587*** 0.364***
(0.097) (0.093) (0.395) (0.110) (0.094)
Head education (years) 0.046 0.03 0.011 0.014
(0.074) (0.024) (0.024) (0.017)
Head education (years)  Log HH size 0.032 0.026 0.025 0.001
(0.054) (0.023) (0.022) (0.010)
Head educ: none (=1)  Log HH size 0.007
(0.595)
Head educ: primary (=1)  Log HH size 0.169
(0.656)
Head educ: some sec. (=1)  Log HH size 0.115
(0.638)
Controls for soil type Log HH size 0.619*** 0.719*** 0.556*** 0.272***
(0.047) (0.076) (0.050) (0.045)
Notes: All regressions include same location fixed effects as previous tables; Standard errors clustered at level of FE; sample weights used; each row group represents a
separate regression; dependent variable in all regressions is the log of total labor demand on farm; above/below median expenditure refers to expenditure per capita.
*** Significant at 1%.
** Significant at 5%.
⁄ Significant at 10%.
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heterogeneous effects or confounding variation from variables that
may influence both household size and labor demand on farm. First
we split the sample into households above and below median
expenditure per capita, because wealthier households may have
greater capacity to hire labor when needed or to acquire additional
land when endowed with enough labor to farm it. Second, in a sep-
arate set of regressions we control for the education level of the
household head, as well as interactions between the head’s educa-
tion and the log of household size. Here, education proxies for
overall human capital. Third, because it remains possible that
household size is endogenous to unobserved farm quality, we
included additional controls for the share of owned land of various
soil types (sandy, loam, clay). Data on soil type is not available for
Ethiopia. Table 11 shows the main results from each of these addi-
tional tests (full results available upon request). In all cases, the
relationship between household size and labor demand on farm
remains economically and statistically significant. The level values
of the estimated elasticities are essentially unchanged from those
reported in the main tables.5. Conclusions
Using a theoretically-grounded, reduced form test for complete
and competitive markets, we have shown that the relationship
between labor demand and household size is broadly consistent
with the existence of widespread, multiple market failures across
agrarian communities in five Sub-Saharan African countries.
Despite widespread participation in labor and land markets by
agricultural households across SSA, regression results based on a
simple, reduced form exclusionary restriction derived from the
first order necessary conditions of the household optimization
problem indicate that household endowments influence factor
demand in a way that is inconsistent with the separation hypoth-
esis implied by the assumption of complete and competitive factor
markets. This finding corresponds with the unconditional results
suggested by simple kernel regressions of labor demand on house-
hold factor endowments. The overall conclusion supports thePlease cite this article in press as: Dillon, B., Barrett, C.B. Agricultural factor ma
failure. Food Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.015widespread sense among the development community that rural
markets regularly fail African farmers. But it is important to note
that the tests implemented here, even though they rely on an anal-
ysis of labor market transactions, do not allow us to identify pre-
cisely which factor markets fail, as violations of the separation
hypothesis can occur even with perfectly functioning labor mar-
kets (Barrett, 1996). The fact that a large share of agricultural
households transact in rural labor, land, and output markets sug-
gests that the issue is less one of outright market absence than of
structural barriers – perhaps related to financial intermediation,
uncertain and expensive contract enforcement, weak physical
infrastructure that results in high transactions costs, etc. – that
impede efficient factor market functioning for most rural house-
holds. The fact that these market failures are not concentrated
among households readily identified by location or gender signals
that these market failures are general and structural.
As the development community and African governments
increasingly intervene to try to rectify perceived market failures,
the onus now falls on researchers to more precisely locate the
sources and causes of factor market failures that impede produc-
tivity and income growth in rural Africa. Effective targeting of
interventions depends on more precise, structural estimation that
goes beyond the reduced form tests we offer in this paper. This will
require methodological advances to take advantage of data now
becoming available to help inform the design and evaluation of
policies intended to help stimulate African agricultural and rural
development.
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